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INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation is critical for firm performance, yet the common assumption 
that technological innovation is directly connected to superior firm performance overlooks the 
key role of business models (Amit & Zott, 2001; Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 2013). Business 
models are cognitive devices representing a business enterprise’s value creation and value 
capture activities (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Teece, 
2010). By adopting different business models managers can, for example, leverage the same 
technology to target different customer segments, as in the case of satellite technologies used for 
selling both communication services and navigation devices. Thus, business models connect the 
technological and economic domains of a business by articulating “a value proposition latent in 
the new technology” (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002: 534). Although the role of business 
models is increasingly recognized (Zott & Amit, 2007, 2008; Zott et al., 2011), we echo some 
recent works (Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 2013; Klang et al., 2014) in claiming that our 
understanding of the relationship between business models and firm performance in technology-
based environments (i.e., contexts where firms are pressured to constantly innovate their 
technology to compete) is still incomplete.
In particular, previous studies of business models have devoted relatively little attention 
to the fact that firms often run multiple business models simultaneously, thus implementing 
configurations of business models (for exceptions see Andries et al., 2013; Casadesus-Masanell 
& Tarzijan, 2012; Markides & Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010). Business model 
configurations are especially important in technology-based environments where firms often 
“require distinct business models that operate in tandem” (Casadesus-Masanell & Tarzijan, 2012: 
132) to develop multiple revenue streams with the same technology. For example, Amazon uses 
the same online platform to sell both cloud computing services and household goods, targeting 
different customer segments with different business models. Analyzing Amazon’s multiple 
business models as a configuration (rather than as a set of isolated elements) would reveal the 
potential synergies among the firm’s business models, such as cross-selling opportunities 
between the different taregeted customer groups. More generally, a configurational approach is 
valuable because it indicates when a firm’s business models are complementary—i.e., when the 
joint adoption of two or more business models is associated with higher firm performance than 
the separate adoption of each business model  (c.f. Kogut et al., 2004; MacDuffie, 1995; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Despite its analytical value, extant literature has overlooked the 
configuration of a firm’s business models as a salient unit of analysis to better understand firm 
performance, mostly focusing on the performance implications of single business models 
considered in isolation (Zott & Amit, 2007, 2008; Zott et al., 2011). In addition, the exact nature 
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of the complementarities underpinning high-performing configurations has not been fully 
unpacked in previous studies (e.g. Ennen & Richter, 2010 for a review), so that we do not have a 
systematic understanding of why high-performing business model configurations are associated 
with high performance. Accordingly, in this paper we investigate the following two research 
questions: Which configurations of business models are associated with high and low levels of 
firm performance in a technology-based environment? What is the nature of the 
complementarities underlying high-performing configurations?
We address these questions with a qualitative analysis of the business model 
configurations adopted by the twenty-eight Formula One (F1) racing firms competing between 
2005 and 2013. The F1 industry constitutes a technology-based environment characterized by the 
continuous development of cutting-edge motorsport technology (e.g. Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; 
Jenkins, 2010, 2014; Jenkins et al., 2005). Major automobile companies participate in F1 
competitions in order to develop and test successful technological solutions, which are often later 
adopted in standard road cars. Thus, by studying F1, we also elucidate an important source of 
innovation for the global automotive industry that is connected to tomorrow’s mobility.
Our empirical enquiry followed three steps. First, by coding archival data and interviews 
with F1 experts, we identified the business model configurations adopted by F1 firms. Second, 
we analysed these configurations and their association with firm performance via Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA), a configurational, case-oriented, method (Ragin, 1987, 2000, 
2008) well-suited to address our research questions. Third, we inductively explore why the 
business models bundled in the high-performing configurations (identified via QCA) are 
complementary—i.e., why some of the configurations are actually high-performing. For this 
purpose, we conducted a second round of interviews with F1 experts to interpret our QCA 
results, inquiring into the synergies underpinning high-performing configurations. 
Taken together, our analyses revealed two main findings. First, five of the six 
configurations associated with high performance feature the joint adoption of two specific 
business models: 1) a F1 supply business model focused on the sale of technology components 
(e.g., engines) to other F1 firms (i.e., direct competitors in F1 racing); 2) a talent business model 
focused on the development and trade of F1 drivers with other F1 firms. In addition, these two 
business models are not featured in any (with the exception of one) of the ten configurations 
associated with low performance. Second, we discovered that these two business models not 
only allow accessing valuable resources (i.e., financial, knowledge, human), but are linked by 
capability-enhancing complementarities, so that the joint implementation of the two business 
models supports the development of firms’ capabilities, fostering faster learning and strengheting 
the firms’ focus on their core activities. 
BUSINESS MODEL CONFIGURATIONS AND PERFORMANCE
Through the literature on business models, scholars have aimed to understand the 
complex systems of activities by which firms generate and capture value. Despite the growing 
body of research on this topic, several problems remain unsolved—most prominently the 
relationship between business models and firm performance (Zott & Amit, 2007, 2008). This 
issue is complex because, especially in technology-based environments, firms run multiple 
business models simultaneously to leverage the multiple commercial uses of the same 
technology (Andries et al., 2013; Casadesus-Masanell & Tarzijan, 2012; Markides & Charitou, 
2004; Sabatier et al., 2010). Previous studies argue that it is paramount to understand how 
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business model choices affect firms’ ability to profit from their technological innovation (cf. 
Chesbrough, 2006; Teece, 1986). However, this can be challenging when business models 
cannot be considered in isolation, but should be understood within the configuration of other 
business models that the firm implements (Markides & Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010). 
Yet, beyond the notion that new technology can trigger change in business models (Björkdahl, 
2009; Chesbrough, 2010), extant literature provides relatively scarce empirical evidence of how 
the heterogeneity of business models relates to firm performance. To tackle this thorny issue, we 
first introduce the definition of business model informing our research and then discuss the 
concept of business model configuration.
Teece (2010: 172) argues that a business model defines “the manner in which the 
enterprise delivers value to customers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts those 
payments into profits”. Business models can describe any type of business enterprise: a service 
firm, a local cafe, a racing company, a sports federation, or a TV station. In this study, we follow 
the research tradition conceptualizing the business model as a cognitive device to account and 
articulate a business’ value creation and capture activities (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; 
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Martins et al., 2015; 
Teece, 2010). 
More specifically, we follow the conceptualization of Baden-Fuller and Mangematin 
(2013) in specifying four constitutive elements of a business model: customer sensing, customer 
engagement, monetization, and value chain linkages. Customer sensing refers to the 
identification of customer groups and their demands. Customer engagement consists in defining 
the value proposition. A common distinction in the literature separates pre-designed (i.e., ‘bus’) 
products and services from custom-made (i.e., ‘taxi’) solutions. Monetization addresses how 
firms capture portions of the value that they create, encompassing pricing and the mechanisms 
(e.g., freemium; work for hire etc.) by which customers can be convinced to pay for the products 
or services that they consume. Finally, value chain linkages concern the governance architecture 
of value creation and capture, defining the degrees of integration in a firm’s relationships with its 
suppliers and other stakeholders (vertical integration vs network architecture).
Technology-based environments are arenas in which firms are frequently pressured to 
innovate their technology to compete. In these contexts, technological innovation often allows 
firms to implement “several different business models simultaneously to serve different 
consumers […and to] help them to develop the market value of their activities and generate 
revenue streams to balance the uncertainties” (Sabatier et al., 2010: 432). Consider, for example, 
the case of Netflix, which uses two business models simultaneously—one for its DVD-by-mail 
services and another for its streaming-video services. In such cases, the unit of analysis that is 
most useful to understand how business models relate to performance is the configuration of 
business models that a firm implements—rather than any single business model per se. In fact, 
adopting a configurational perspective on business models allows us to evaluate whether a firm’s 
different business models are complements (Andries et al., 2013; Casadesus-Masanell & 
Tarzijan, 2012; Markides & Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010). Recent studies suggest that to 
foster performance without cannibalizing its different activities, a firm implementing two 
business models simultaneously needs “to balance the benefits of keeping the two business 
models separate while at the same time integrating them enough so as to allow them to exploit 
synergies with one another” (Markides & Charitou, 2004: 22). The need for such a balance 
implies the existence of an optimum point in the trade-off across different business models, 
which can be achieved by varying the way in which they fit with each other. For example, 
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Sabatier, Mangematin, and Rousselle (2010) show that young biotech firms manage this tension 
by running a short-term business with immediate returns while simultaneously investing in 
future-oriented business. In doing so, they balance time lags, risks, and interdependencies, 
maintaining high returns on investment—see also the case of LAN Airlines by Casadesus-
Masanell and Tarzijan (2012). There are also cases in which different business models in a 
configuration conflict with each other. Consider, for example, the case of Kodak, which ran two 
business models—one for digital and one for film photography—for a long time without 
acknowledging that the models were not complements (see Gavetti et al., 2005). These cases of 
success and failure represent two sides of the same coin: to leverage the potential value that is 
embedded in their technology, firms need to appreciate the variety of business models that they 
implement and understand the possible complementarities among them. For this reason, different 
business model configurations can be expected to be associated with different levels of 
performance, providing insights into the complementarities underlying high performance.
RESEARCH SETTING AND FINDINGS
Our study is based on a qualitative analysis of the business model configurations adopted 
by all the F1 firms competing during the period between 2005 and 2013 (a total of 28 firms). F1 
is not only the most technologically advanced motorsport in the world but also an empirical
setting increasingly used for robust management research (as confirmed by several studies such 
as Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Jenkins & Floyd, 2001; Jenkins & Tallman, 2010; Khanna et al., 
2003; Pinch et al., 2003; Tallman et al., 2004). F1 racing comprises an annual calendar of about 
twelve car races taking place around the world. In each race, each F1 firm (also called “F1 
teams” due to the sport nature of this industry) competes by having two drivers racing two 
almost identical cars. Drivers gain a number of points according to their arrival position in each 
race, and the final tally at the end of the season reflects the total points that they gain over the 
series of races. Since 1981, all F1 firms are required to develop their own car chassis internally,
although the engine and all the other components can be purchased from third parties (external 
suppliers or other F1 firms). 
F1 is an industry that is worthy of research attention per se as it has an estimated yearly 
turnover of more than US$3.5 billion, employs approximately 50,000 people in more than 30 
countries, and represents the pinnacle of automotive technologies (Jenkins et al., 2005). F1 firms 
often develop and transfer technological innovations to road car companies. F1 also feeds new 
technological innovations to many different industries (Moskvitch, 2011). For instance, F1 
innovations have made their way not only into the regular automotive industry (e.g., ABS brakes, 
traction control, hybrid powertrains, active suspensions, finger-controlled gear shift systems, 
high-performing hybrid engines) but also into the bicycle (e.g., carbon-fiber composite frames) 
and sailing (e.g., composites for racing boats rudders) industries. Further, F1 innovations have 
provided technologies that are now used in factories, hospitals, and Olympics’ sports training 
(e.g., advanced telemetry systems; high-speed swimming suits) and that have contributed to 
advanced engineering (e.g., virtual design and simulators) and even public transportation systems 
(e.g., flywheel energy storage mechanisms).
In this study, we explore the association between business model configurations and 
different levels of performance in a technology-based environment (i.e., F1 racing). We find that 
configurations comprising business models leveraging technological resources (i.e., F1 supply) 
and human resources (i.e., talent) are associated with high performance. In addition, we find that 
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these business models are underpinned by capability-enhancing complementarities, such that 
their joint adoption critically accelerates a firm’s learning and enhances its focus on core 
activities, thus supporting the development of firm-specific capabilities.
While qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) helps us identify which business model 
configurations are associated to high and low performance, it does not provide details about the 
nature of the complementarities underlying different business model configurations. We found 
that by selling relevant technological components to other F1 firms, F1 teams that operate as part 
suppliers gain access to a set of critical resources going beyond the financial ones. In particular, 
they access a large set of data and information about their own technological components derived 
from their clients’ cars—i.e., data on how the supplied engines perform in clients’ cars during 
races. This implies that the more F1 firms engage with F1 competitors as customers, the bigger 
the data they obtain: for example if a firm sells its engines to other two F1 firms (e.g., Ferrari 
sold its engines to Scuderia Toro Rosso and Sauber), the F1 firm will access technical data from 
six cars on the racetrack (each F1 firms deploys simultaneously two cars). This larger and 
enhanced set of data represents an additional resource, supporting learning processes and 
enhancing capabilities for technology development. Indeed, this helps the team designing and 
manufacturing a better car, which is the basic technology used to train drivers and develop the 
drivers’ skills. In addition, because of data-informed training, talented drivers achieve a better 
understanding of their firm’s technology and can provide better feedback to the engineers 
regarding how to improve technological components, thus further enhacing the firm’s 
technological capability. This is complementary to driver development activities via the talent 
business model. Overall, the capabilities developed through the supply business model enhance 
the training experience developed through the talent business model, thus creating better 
capabilities in developing new drivers—key assets in F1—which in turn can offer more informed 
advice to the engineering team about the context of use of technology, and in terms of 
technology development priorities. Better drivers and better technology are the fundamental 
premise to foster F1 firms’ racing results as well as their other outcomes deriving from other 
activities (prospect technological supply; sponsorships; band royalties; etc.).
All in all, apart from the important but somehow obvious financial and commercial
returns that each business model entails, we found that the nature of the complementarity 
between business models associated with higher performance is capability-enhancing (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). This in F1 corresponds to the joint configuration of two business models (i.e., 
supply and talent) that focus the racing core activities (i.e., developing racing technology and 
training drivers). Still, less focused business models (e.g., internal and external knowledge 
transfer) that move the firm’s attention away from its core racing activities might overall reduce 
learning and thus increase the risk of being associated with low performance: a result that in F1 
cannot be counterbalanced by mere commercial and economic returns.
IMPLICATIONS
First, our findings contribute to the literature that connects business models to technology 
and performance (Zott & Amit, 2007, 2008), with particular reference to business model 
configurations (Andries et al., 2013; Casadesus-Masanell & Tarzijan, 2012; Markides & 
Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010), by elucidating the nature of the complementarities 
underlying business model configurations. Our study highlights that these complementarities 
may differ depending on the nature of the linkages connecting the different business models in a 
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configuration. Whereas previous research has mostly focused on economic complementarities, 
for example, by exploring cross-subsidies among business models in two- or multi-sided 
platforms (Casadesus-Masanell & Tarzijan, 2012; Eisenmann et al., 2006), our paper emphasizes 
capability-enhacing complementarities. We find that certain business models are useful not only 
because they create and capture value within a line of business (i.e., from a given set of 
customers), but also because they generate human and knowledge resources that can enrich the 
value generated across business models. That is, they help enhancing the value of resources and 
capabilities, which can be used in a different business model adopted by the same firm.
Second, our work contributes to an emerging stream of studies exploring sport 
environments to investigate management topics (Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005) by 
emphasizing the importance of business model configurations in these environments—a 
phenomenon that has received relatively less attention in this research stream. In fact, in recent 
years, academic management studies have increasingly researched sport—and specifically 
Formula 1—exploring topics such as technological innovation (Jenkins, 2010; Jenkins & Floyd, 
2001; Marino et al., 2014), imitation responses (Jenkins, 2013), status interplay between F1 firms 
and their suppliers (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010), and advantages derived from geographical 
localization (Jenkins & Tallman, 2010; Pinch et al., 2003; Tallman et al., 2004). Our paper 
complements these F1-based studies by linking some of the core topics explored in this literature 
(such as technological innovation and learning) to business model configurations, unpacking 
how complementarities are related to the development of capabilities. In doing so, we answer the 
recent call to leverage the rich availability of sport data for better understanding competitive 
dynamics in the academic and in the practitioners’ domains (George et al., 2014; Lewis, 2004). 
An interesting implication for future research of the business model lens explored in this 
study is a refined understanding of competition and competitive groups within an industry (Porac 
et al., 1989) on the basis of business objectives that go beyond the most salient performance 
objective in the industry—in our case: winning car races. Indeed, the fact that certain F1 firms 
might still be able to, literally, “stay in the race” despite underperforming in an industry’s core 
activities sheds light on the fact that some firms might economically survive—even though they 
consistently underperform relative to their rivals—because their business models target viable 
niches. The history of F1 offers several good examples of such firms. For instance, the former 
Italian F1 firm Minardi managed to compete in F1 for twenty years (1985-2005) owing to an 
effective talent system despite achieving poor racing results: during its lifetime, Minardi 
obtained only 38 championship points (16 of which were earned by the firm’s first driver) and 
only one front row start (in 1990) and never achieved a podium finish. This seems to suggest that 
in certain industries different measures of performance co-exist. For example, movies, music, art 
shows, and many other creative products can encounter the critics’ favor and thus being awarded 
prestigious prizes, but remain commercial failures (Caves, 2000). Sport teams might be 
proficient at monetizing their value via fans, sponsors, and merchandizing yet perform poorly in 
matches. Other companies exploring innovative business models (such as the music streaming 
platform Spotify) might experience growth over the years in terms of their user base, but struggle 
to make the business profitable. The analytical focus on business model configurations explored 
in this paper points at the importance, for scholars and practitioners, of being aware of multiple 
performance criteria when observing industries and the synergies between business models.
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